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We study how stylized monetary (proportional money transfers), fiscal 
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simple version of the overlapping generations model. We present also new, 
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STABILIZING COMPETITIVE BUSINESS CYCLES 
Jean-Michel GRANDMONT
Many studies have shown that a competitive economy of which the 
characteristics are deterministic and stationary may display highly complex 
endogenous fluctuations under laisser faire. be they deterministic 
cycles (Benhabib and Day [3], Benhabib and Nishimura [4], Grandmont 193, 
Woodford [15]) or stochastic sunspot equilibria (Shell [14], Azariadis [1],
Cass and Shell [6], Azariadis and Guesnerie [2], Woodford [15], Grandmont 
[12]). In the present paper, we extend the results of Grandmont [9], and study 
how stylized monetary (proportional money transfers), fiscal (lump sum money 
transfers) and budgetary (public expenditures) Government policies may help 
reducing the cyclical properties of a competitive economy.
We focus attention on a simple version of the overlapping generations 
model that Involves only one good and one asset, in which agents live two 
periods, as in [9] (Section 1). We analyse in Sections 2 and 3 how variations 
of predetermined rates of growth of the money supply through the three 
above mentioned channels affect the "cyclical" properties of the economy, i.e. 
how they influence the set of deterministic cycles with perfect foresight 
(Section 2> and the set of stationary Markov sunspot equilibria (Section 3). 
Predetermined proportional money transfers are found as in [9) to be 
superneutral, i.e. they do not alter the set of these equilibria. By contrast, 
increases of the predetermined (and constant over time) money growth rate 
through lump sum transfers and/or-through public expenditures are found to have 
a stabilizing impact. They eliminate in particular', if large enough, all cycles 
with perfect foresight that have a period k > 2 (section 2).
We establish in Section 3 a new, constructive characterization of 




























































































that sort of model, in which the underlying deterministic perfect foresight 
dynamics in onedimensional. We get then as a corollary that such sunspot 
equilibria exist if and only if there is a "noncritical" period 2 cycle, a 
result obtained in the case of laisser faire by Azariadis and Guesnerie [21 by 
different techniques. We get also as a corollary that stationary sunspot 
equilibria exist arbitrarily close to the deterministic monetary stationary 
state if and only if it is asymptotically stable in the (forward) perfect 
foresight dynamics that is defined locally in its neighbourhood (for similar 
results, see Gourieroux, Laffont, Monfort 173, Woodford [15D. The results of 
Sections 2 and 3 imply in particular that predetermined changes of the money 
growth rate through lump sum transfers and/or public expenditures that 
eliminate nontrivial cycles with perfect foresight do eliminate stationary 
Markov sunspot equilibria as well.
Such predetermined changes of the growth rate of the money supply do not 
guarantee, however, the disappearance of the forecasting mistakes that the 
traders may make. There are still many possible nonstationary intertemporal 
equilibria with self-fulfilling expectations and the inference problem to be 
solved by the agents is a very difficult one. We show in Section 4 how 
deterministic policy rules can, if believed and understood by private 
units, solve this expectations coordination problem and guarantee perfect 
foresight. It was proved in 191 that monetary policy alone, through nominal 
interest payments, could achieve this goal and moreover, force the economy to 
converge to the Golden rule stationary state, provided that it was 
asymptotically stable in the forward perfect foresight dynamics that is defined 
in its neighbourhood. We show in Section 4 that with lump sum transfers and 
public expenditures, the stability requirement can be dropped : there are 
policy rules through these channels that ensure perfect foresight stability of 
the target equilibrium. The design of such policies necessitates only the 
knowledge of the local behaviour of the economy around the Golden Rule.
1. SHORT RUN EQUILIBRIUM




























































































model and of the relations determining a competitive equilibrium at any date.
We consider the simple specification of the overlapping generations 
model, without bequests, in which production is taken for simplicity as 
exogenous, that was used in Grandmont [91. The model Involves one nonstorable 
good and a single asset, “money", that is employed for transferring wealth from 
one period to the next. Agents live two periods and are identical (equivalently 
there is a single agent) in each generation. The agents' endowments of the good 
at each age t = 1,2 are
l*  > 0, l  > 0 (I.a)
1 2
The agents' tastes among consumption streams a > 0 , a > 0  are described by
I = 2 -
the separable utility function V (a ) + V (a ) with
1 1 2  2
For each t - 1,2 , V (a ) is continuous on C0,+~) and twice (l.b)
T T
continuously differentiable on (0,+~) . Moreover. V'(a ) > 0 ,
T T
V"(a ) < 0 for a > 0 , and lim V'(a ) = +- , lim V'(a ) = 0 .
i t  t a -»0 t t a ->+“ T T
T T
We focus on the Samuelson case, in which autarchy is inefficient,
that is
9 = V'(£*)/V'(£*) < 1  (l.c)
1 1 2  2
We assume that there is in addition a "Government" that has three 
available instruments. At date t , it makes a money transfer that is 
proportional to the money holding of the old agent, at the rate x -1
(nominal interest payments). It gives also a lump sum money subsidy S




























































































the amount of money G when purchasing (or selling) some quantity of thet
( 1 )
good . In the sequel it will be often convenient to consider as the
Government's instrumental variables the rates of growth of the money supply
that are attributable to lump sum transfers and to the deficit 0 = S + G
t t t
excluding interest payments, i.e.
s = (M x + S ) / M X
t t-1 t t t-1 t
d = (M X + S + G ) / M x
t t-1 t t t t-1 t
where M
t-1
> 0 designates the money
(1 .1 )
evolution of the money supply is then ruled by
M = M x d > 0 .  M > 0  aiven
t t-1 t t o
( 1.2)
It will be assumed for all t
x > 0 , d  > 0 , s  > 0
t t t
(l.d)
The assumption s^ > 0 is made for analytical convenience and means that lump
sum taxes do not wipe out the old agent's money balance. Conditions (l.a) 
through (l.d) will be assumed to hold without any further reference.
A newborn trader has to solve the following decision problem. Let p > 0
e e e
be the current money price of the good, and let p > 0 , x > 0  and Am stand
for the price of the good, the proportional money transfer and the lump sum
subsidy that he expects (with subjective certainty) for the next date,
respectively. The consumer must choose then his current and future consumptions
a > 0 , a > 0 , and his money demand m > 0 so as to maximize his utility 






























































































pa + m = p i and
e e * e e
p a  - p i  + mx + Am ( I .3)
e e e e
The solution of this problem depends only on 8 = px /p and on a - Am /p
problem has a solution, which is unique, if and only if 0-f̂  + l  + o > 0 .
. The 
In
that case, we denote the optimum excess demands for the good a - l  as z (0,o).
T T T
They satisfy
0z <0,a ) + z ( 0 , o ) - a H 0 (1.4)
1 2
On the other hand, money demand is given by
d e e  e e
m (p,p /x ,o) i  -p z ( 0 ,o) T (p /x H z  (0 ,o) - o] 
1 2
(1.5)
An important point to note is that when Sl^ + l  + o > 0 , and when money













* *  *
In the limiting case 0£ + l  + o = 0 , money demand m = pi may be viewed
1 2 1
also as the unique solution of (1.6) although the latter reads then + •« = + ■».
The equilibrium condition at date t is now easy to state. The excess 
demand for the good of the old trader and of the Government is equal to the 
real value M /p of the money supply, in which p > 0 is the current money
price of the good. Competitive equilibrium of the good market at date t reads 
then, with obvious notations
e e e e
z (p x /p , S /p ) 
1 t t+1 t+1 t+l t+1






























































































in which the superscript "e" denotes values that are anticipated by the young 
trader at t for the next date. This formulation takes implicitly into account 
the restriction
P x  l  
t t+1 1
e * e
p l  + S > 0 
t+1 2 t+1 =
( 1. 8 )
which is necessary for the function to be well defined. By Walras' law, the 
money equilibrium equation may be obtained by multiplying both members of (1.7) 
by p^ —  see (1.5).
The equilibrium condition at t can be given another equivalent form, 
which is often more convenient, by setting m equal to M in the first order 
condition (1.6). This yields
M
* t  e e  * e e  e
V ' t e ----) = (p x /p ) V’ U  + (M x + S ) / p ) (1.9)
1 1 Pt t t+1 t+1 2 2 t t+1 t+1 t+1
Here again, the restriction (1.8) 1s Implicitly taken into account since the 
arguments of V' and V' must be nonnegative.
2. CYCLES UITH PERFECT FORESIGHT
We assume in this section that the (doubly infinite) sequences of policy 
parameters (x^) , (s^) , (d^) are predetermined. with s^ = s and d^ = d
for all t . Our goal will be to analyse the influence of these policy 
parameters on the set of periodic equilibria of the economy, under the 
assumption of perfect foresight. It will be shown in particular that less and 
less cycles with perfect foresight do exist when s and/or d gets larger. In 
this sense, an increase of the size of the Government's intervention through 




























































































Trajectories with perfect foresight
Given (x ) , s , d and M , (1.2) determines the money supplies M 
t o  t
while and G^ are given by (1.1). An intertemporal competitive
eouilibrium with perfect foresight corresponding to M and the
o
predetermined policy parameters is then a (again doubly infinite) sequence of 
prices (p^) that verifies (1.7), or (1.9), for all t , where the superscripts
”e" have been suppressed.
Such an intertemporal equilibrium is most conveniently described in
terms of the variable 6 - p x /p , which is equal to one plus the real
t t t+1 t+1
interest rate between dates t and t+t , and the real balance p = M /p .
t t t
Indeed suppressing the superscript ”e" and multiplying both members of (1.9) by 
M^/p^ yields
* - 1  * -|
m V'(£. - p ) = d p V'(£ + s d p ) (2.1)
t i l  t t+1 2 2 t+1
If one defines next
v^(p) = p Vjffj - p) for p in t0,£^) (2.2)
v (p) = p V'(£ + p) for p in CO,+«)
2 2 2
*
the function v is increasing and maps (0/ ) onto C0,+~) , while v maps 
1 1 2
(0,+“) into itself. Thus v has an inverse and (2.1) leads to
1
-I -I -1
p = v ts v (sd p )) T x (p ) (2.3)
t 1 2 t+t s,d t+1
An intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight may then be 




























































































corresponding sequence of real interest rates is given in turn by (1.2), which 
reads here
m = p 8 d (2.4)
t+1 t t
These equations show that the set of intertemporal equilibria with 
perfect foresight is independent, in real terms, of the initial money stock M
o
(money is neutral). and of the predetermined sequence (x^) (proportional
money transfers are superneutral). By contrast, the parameters s , d 
(fiscal and budgetary policies) do influence the set of real perfect 
foresight equilibrium magnitudes, although they are predetermined.
The following result gives useful information on the backward perfect
foresight (b.p.f.) mao on real balances x that is defined in (2.3). Its
s,d
proof is omitted since it follows readily from the definitions.
PROPOSITION 2.1. The mao x from [0,+») into t0,£ ) is continuously
s,d I
-  -1
differentiable. with x (0) = 0 and x' (0) = (d8) . Moreover.
s,d s,d
-I
I) The intersection of the graph of x with the line p -(d8) p
s,d t t+1
is composed of the origin p = p = 0 and of at most another point.
t+1 t
The two points of intersection coincide if only if 8 < 0 .
2) If d8 > 1 , x has a unique fixed point at the origin (a nonmonetary 
= s,d
stationary state). If d8 < 1 , x has another fixed point p > 0
s,d s,d
(the unique monetary stationary state).
Fig. 1 shows how the b.p.f. dynamics on real balances implied by (2.3) 
may be represented by using the graph of x
s,d
































































































The graph of the map x Is a deformation of the graph of the b.p.f. 
s,d
-1
map x = v o v on real balances that is obtained under laisser faire, i.e. 
t 2
when s = d = I . It is known that the graph of x represents the traders' 
offer curve under laisser faire and that there may exist many cycles with 
perfect foresight if this offer curve displays a significant hump (see 131,
C93). We wish to see here how changes of the policy parameters s and d affect 
the shape of the offer curve and may reduce the size of the set of cycles with 
perfect foresight, i.e. of the periodic points of x
s,d
To fix ideas, assume that the laisser faire map x has a cycle of period 
k > 2 . This implies that x . on equivalently v , has at least one local
maximum and that the least value for which a local maximum occurs, say p' > 0 ,
satisfies x <p '1 > m ' • From (2.3) the least value of p for which x has a
-1 , S'd local maximum is s d p  .It is then clearly possible to choose s and/or d so
that x has no cycle other than the stationary states : it suffices to bring 
s,d
-1





























































































PROPOSITION 2 .2 . L e t  p ' > O b , the. k a s t  v a lUe_,.,f or  which v ?
local maximum. Then x has no cycle with a period k > 2 if 
s,d =
-1 -1 -1 -t
X (s d p') = v ts v (p')l < s d |i' 
s,d 1 2 =
The foregoing result encompasses three interesting particular cases.
1. Consider an increase of d from 1 to d > 1 , with s being fixed and
equal to I (change of the money growth rate through the Government's purchases
of the good, no lump sum transfers). Then the graph of x Is the affine
1, d
transformation of the offer curve under laisser faire x , parallel Op and
t+t
of ratio d . If d is large enough, x̂  has no nontrivial cycle. One must keep 
dB < t to ensure the existence of a monetary stationary state.
2. Consider an increase of the rate of growth of the money supply
through lump sum transfers from 1 to s > I , the Government being inactive on
the good market, i.e. d is constantly equal to s . The graph of the laisser
faire map x Is pushed down, and the critical points of x are the same
s,s
as those of x • If s = d is large enough, x has no cycle of a period k > 2 .
s,s =
Here again, one must have d8 < 1 for a monetary stationary state to exist.
3. Let the Government increase its expenditures but balance its budget,
i.e. d is fixed and equal to I , while's decreases from t to s < 1 . The
associated map x is given by 
s, 1
-I *
X ( p) = v C p V ' ( £  + s p ) l  
s, 1 I 2 2
Thus its graph goes up as s decreases, the slope of the tangent at the 
origin being constant and equal to 0 . The least value for which x has a
i s'!-1 x




























































































when s gets lower than p '/ t . Since x (s
I s, I
corresponding critical point of the graph x 
when s is low enough.
- I
s, I
p') is bounded above by , the 
is bound to cross the diagonal
*
Remark 2.1 : Bifurcations. The above arguments can be used to describe how 
the set of cycles with perfect foresight is progressively reduced when one 
changes continuously the policy parameters s and/or d , by applying the theory 
of the bifurcations of onedimensional discrete dynamical systems, as in [9,101. 
If the laisser faire offer curve x 1s unimodal with the unique maximum 
*
occurring at p , the graph of x is also unimodal from (2.3), the critical
s,d
-1 * 3 * *
point being s dp . Assume now that under laisser faire, one has x (p ) < p ,
which implies that x has a cycle of period 3 (see [93). Then if one follows a
path in the plane (s,d) that starts from laisser faire (s = d = 1) and ends at
a configuration verifying the conditions of Proposition 2.2, the resulting
family of maps x will typically undergo eventually a succession of "period 
s,d
halving" bifurcations : the bifurcation diagram will be qualitatively similar
( 2 )
to e.g. [9, Fig. 41, with a reversed orientation
3. STATIONARY MARKOV SUNSPOT EQUILIBRIA
Deterministic cycles with perfect foresight are but degenerate cases of
stationary Markov "sunspot" equilibria, in which agents predict that prices
are affected by random factors, although they do not influence the real
characteristics of the economy, and in which this prophecy is self-
fulfilling. We establish in this section, under the assumption that
(x ) , s - s , d = d are predetermined, a new, constructive characterization 
t t t
of stationary Markov sunspot equilibria Involving an arbitrary number of states 
in that sort of model, in which the underlying perfect foresight dynamics is 




























































































and only if there is a "noncritical" period 2 cycle, a result obtained in the 
case of laisser faire by Azariadis and Guesnerie 121 by different techniques. 
Another corollary of the analysis is that stationary sunspot equilibria exist 
arbitrarily close to the deterministic monetary stationary state if and only if 
it is asymptotically stable in the forward perfect foresight dynamics that is 
defined locally in its neighbourhood (for similar results see, Gourieroux, 
Laffont, Monfort C7], Woodford C1 Si).
Consider a stationary Markov chain of random variables (sunspots) taking
values in some space Q . In order to simplify the exposition, we assume that Q
has r elements, Q = <ui w > , r > 2 and that the transition probabilities
1 r =
from id to tu , say q , satisfy q > 0  for all i,j . The agents are supposed 
1 j 1j 1j
to observe the value of the sunspot at each date, and to know the transition 
probabi1ities.
Let (x ) 
t
s = s , d = d be fixed and known by the agents. Given
M > 0 , the evolution of the money supply is then ruled by M = M x d , 
o t t-1 t
while , G^ are given by (1.1) with s^ = s , d^ = d . The agents are supposed
to know or to forecast correctly these quantities. Assume now that although 
sunspots do not alter the utility functions or the endowments, the agents 
believe nevertheless that they influence the equilibrium price at each date 
through the relation p(ui,M) , in which ui is the sunspot observed at the date 
under consideration and M is the end-of-the-period money stock, with
p ( id ,M) = M/p , all 1 , 0 < p < ... < p , p D p  . (3.1)
i 1 1 = = r 1 r
The above ordering can be obtained through a relabeling of the sunspots. The
condition p * p means that there is genuine uncertainty about prices.
1 r
Since s and d are fixed, this will imply (see (3.6)) that agents believe that





























































































and to the x^ (agents believe that proportional money transfers are
superneutral). The prophecy described in (3.1) will be self-fulfilling, and 
will lead to a stationary Markov sunspot equilibrium if, when agents act in 
accordance to the belief (3.1) , p(ui ,M) is indeed an equilibrium price when
id i,s observed, and when the money supply is M . 
i
In order to translate this notion into a formal definition, consider a 
young agent at an arbitrary date t who observes <u and p^ > 0 in the current
period. If he believes that prices obey (3.1) , he expects the price
p = p(w , M ) to occur with probability q at the next date. His problem 
j j t+1 1j
is then to choose his current consumption â  > 0 and his money demand m > 0 ,
as well as his future consumption a > 0 in the event where ui will be
2j = j
observed at the next date, so as to maximize the mathematical expectation of 
his utility
V (a ) + E q V (a ) (3.2)
1 1  j ij 2 2j
subject to the current and expected budget constraints
p a + m = p l  














j = 1,.. .r
(3.3)
where S = (s-1) M x . This decision problem has a solution, which is 
t+1 t t+1 * *
then unique, if and only if x p l  + p l  + S > 0  for all j .
t+1 t 1 j 2 t+1 =
The most convenient way to characterize the solution is to look at the 





























































































V'(a)/p -  t q x V'(a )/p
I t  t j ij t+l 2 2j j




mx mx + S
t+t * t+t t+l
E q ----- V'te + ------------ )
j 1j P 2 2 p
j J
(3.4)
Equilibrium at t is obtained by setting the young trader's demand m
-t
equal to fl in (3.4) . By using M x - d M and 
t t t+t t+t
-t
M x + S = sd M to rearrange the right hand member, and by employing 
t t+t t+t t+l




v (— ) = f q s v (sd m ) (3.5)
I P( j Ij 2 j
*
Since v is an increasing function from 10,1 ) onto C0,+“ ) , the condition 
I I
(3.5) determines uniquely the equilibrium price p^ at an arbitrary date t
as a function of ui and of M . This equation leads therefore to a well defined 
i t
causal (stochastic) dynamics of temporary equilibria, in which the past
(3)
determines the present
Given M , (x ) , s = s and d = d for all t , a stationary Markov 
o t t t
sunspot equilibrium (with r states) is a price function p(ui ,M) satisfvino
(3.1) such that the solution in p^ gf (3.5) given u> and , is indeed M^/p
or equivalently such that for all i 
-t -t
v (p ) - E q s v(sd u)





























































































The agents' belief is then self-fulfilling, and M/p(w,M) follows a Markov chain
on the set <p ,...,p > with transition probabilities q . In the limit case 
I r 1 j
r = 2 , q = q = 1 , one gets of course a cycle with perfect foresight of
period 2 , see (2.3).
Ue characterize now the real balances appearing in (3.6) by using the
map x . To simplify notations, since s,d are given, we shall pose until the 
s,d
end of this section
X - x , m = M and v (p) = s v(sd p) (3.7)
s,d s,d 2 2
Consider a sunspot equilibrium (p ,...,p ) as in (3.6). Let now m and n
1 r
be integers such that v (p ) < v (p ) < v (p ) for all i . It follows from
2 n = 2 i = 2 m
(3.6) that one has for all 1 , v (p ) < v (p ) < v (p ) . Since p < p , the
2 n = I i = 2 m 1 r
expressions v (p ) and v (p ) , and thus p and p , must differ, and one has 
2 n 2 m m n
actually v (p ) < v (p ) < v (p ) for all i , since the probabilities q and 
2 n 1 i 2 m im
q are both positive. Applying this fact to m and n , one gets 
in
v (p ) < v (p ) and v (p ) < v (p ) , or equivalently 'x(p ) < p and 
2 n I n  t m 2 m  n n
p < x (m ) • The final step is to remark that the configuration p < p is
impossible, since it would imply that x has two distinct monetary stationary
states. Hence we obtain that there exist two integers m,n such that p < p
m n
and
v (p ) < v (p ) < v (p ) < v (p ) (3.8)





























































































X (p ) < M < P < X<P ) (3.9)
n I r m
Consider conversely a sequence 0 < p < ... < p and assume that there
1 = = r
exist p < p such that (3.9) or (3.8) holds. Is there a Markov chain on C such
m n
that (p ,...,p ) defines a stationary Markov sunspot equilibrium, i.e. 
1 r
satisfies (3.6) ? Here the unknowns are the transition probabilities q and it
is clear that given (3.8) , one can find probabilities q > 0  acting on Q so
ij
as to satisfy (3.6). The simplest way to generate a solution is to solve (3.6)
by setting first q = 0 when j * m,n (this determines uniquely q > 0  and
i j im
q > 0  for all i) and then to perturbate slightly the probabilities so as to 
in
make all of them positive. Obviously, the set of solutions is nonempty, and 
open. We have thus obtained
PROPOSITION 3.1. Given Q = <u> ,... ,ui > , the real balances 0 < p < ... < p
1 r i = : r
define a stationary Markov sunspot equilibrium if and only if there exist
p < p that satisfy (3.9). 
m n
This characterization yields the most general way to construct 
stationary Markov sunspot equilibria involving r states : it suffices to find
two values p' , p" satisfying x(p") < p' < p" < x <p 'I . and to distribute
arbitrarily p ,...,p in the interval (x(p’) , x(p'D , two of these values 
I r
being equal to p' and p" . The analysis yields also as an immediate corollary 
that such a sunspot equilibrium exists in the present framework if and only
if the map x has a cycle of period 2 . In fact, since we have only considered
"nondegenerate" sunspot equilibria (q > 0  for all i,j and p t p ) , we wish




























































































to show this equivalence with cycles that are also "nondegenerate". The
situation to be avoided is the limit case where x has a cycle of period 2 —  in
-1 _2
which case x'(0) - (d¥) > I and the second iterate of * , i.e. x . has a
fixed point that differs from 0 and from the monetary stationary state
_ _2
p z p —  but where the graph of x has no point below the diagonal when 
s,d
0 < p < (7 , nor any point above it when m > p • Formally, we say that x has
a noncritical cycle of period 2 if there exists a period 2 cycle and if
_2
there exists either p' 1n (0,p) such that x (p'l < p' . or p” > p such that 
_2
x (p") > p” .
It was shown in Grandmont [12, (3.12U that the laisser faire map
x = x had a noncritical cycle of period 2 if and only if there existed p'
1 ^
and p" verifying x(p) < p' < p" < x <m '1 . The proof —  which is 
straightforward —  applies without any change to x . Thus
PROPOSITION 3.2. The map x - X has a noncritical cycle of period 2 if and
s,d
only if there exist p' and p" such that < p' < p" < xTp'l •
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 establish the equivalence we were looking for.
Proposition 3.1 allows also characterizing the conditions under which
stationary sunspots equilibria exist near the stationary state p. Let x'(0) > 1
and assume away the "nongeneric" case x '<m ) = 1 .If stationary Markov sunspot
equilibria exist arbitrarily close to p , there are pairs (p ,p ) in every
m n




























































































X<M > < M < M < M < X(M > 
n m n m
For each such pair, by continuity, there exists p In (p ,p) such that
m
-2
p = x <m ) and thus x <M> < P • Since p is arbitrarily close to p , this implies 
n
-2 -  -  -  2 -  -  
that Dx (p) = Cx'ipll > 1 in which case x'(p) < - 1 .
Assume conversely that x‘(p) < — 1 . The local picture around p is
represented in Fig. 2. If p̂  is less than but close enough to p ,
then p < ... < p satisfies the conditions of Proposition 3.1 and thus 
1 = = r
defines consistently a stationary Markov sunspot equilibrium if and only if p
r
belongs to the interval tp' , x<P|>) (one takes m = 1 and n = r in this 
case). Thus if x‘(p) < — 1 , there are stationary Markov sunspot equilibria 
arbitrarily near p .
Figure 2
To sum up, if we assume away the specific case x'tp) = 1 , a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the existence of stationary Markov sunspot
equilibria with r states in every neighbourhood of p is x'<p) < -1. This means 
that the monetary stationary state is unstable in the backward perfect
foresight dynamics that is implied by the map x • Or equivalently, that p is 
asymptotically stable in the forward perfect foresight dynamics that is
defined near p by inverting locally the map x • Formally,
PROPOSITION 3.3. Assume x' (0) > 1 and x ” (p) * 1 . There exists a stationary 
markov sunspot eauilibrium with r states in every neighbourhood of p if and 




























































































The above arguments show that given r , the set of stationary Markov
sunspot equilibria with r states (characterized by (p ,__,p ) and the
1 r
probabilities q > 0 for all i,j) 1s finite dimensional and open. The set of 
all such Markov sunspot equilibria, when the number of states r is variable, is 
by contrast infinite dimensional whenever it 1s nonempty.
The results of this section extend easily to the case where Q is a 
compact metric space, endowed with its Borel a-field. Consider a Markov 
process on fi given by the stationary transition probabilities q(w,B) where the 
map that associates to every id the probability q(ui,.) is continuous when 
the space of probabilities on Q is endowed with the topology of weak 
convergence (Billingsley C5l or Parthasarathy [I3D. We assume that q(w,B) > 0 
for every ui and every nonempty open set B . A price function is defined, as 
in (3.1), as p(u>,M) = M/p(iu) where p(gj) is continuous and bounded awav from 
0 , i.e. p(ui) > a for all id and some a > 0 , and p(ui') t ptui") for some id' , 
id" . The counterpart of Proposition 3.1 is that p(ui) determines a stationary 
Markov sunspot equilibrium if and only if there are id' and id" with 



























































































Such a Markov sunspot equilibrium is described by the continuous map 
p(iu) and the continuous map that associates to every u> the probability q(ui,.) . 
The set of stationary Markov sunspot equilibria is nonempty arid open (in 
the topology of uniform convergence of maps) if and only if ̂ tbere is a 
noncritical period 2 cycle. If Q is infinite dimensional, so is the set of 
stationary Markov sunspot equilibria whenever it is, nonempty.
Remark-3.1. The methods developed in the text for analysing stationary
Markov sunspot equilibria are rather general. Tq illustrate their power,
consider the case where (x ) is predetermined, but where S = 0 , G - p y for
t - t t t
all t , tt > 0 (no lump sum transfers, the Government's purchases of the good
are pegged at t) . In view of (1.9), the corresponding b.p.f. map on real
balances is easily seen to be
-Ip = V [v (p - f)J H X(U ) (3.10)
t 1 2 t+1 t+1 •
(we keep the same notation x as in the text to facilitate the comparison, but 
no confusion should arise). If we think of Fig. 1 as representing the laisser
-1
fa ire offer curve, i.e. the graph of x = v o v , then the graph of the map x
1 2
defined in (3.10) is obtained by translating this offer curve to the right
along the axis Op by the quantity y . As a result, there may exist now 
t+1
several monetary stationary states, i.e. several'p > 0 such that p = x<p) •
The analogue of (3.6) becomes in this context
V (p ) = £ q v (p -y) (3.11)
1 i j 1j 2 j
Then replicating the argument leading to Proposition 3.1 yields immediately
that p < ... < p defines a stationary Markov sunspot equilibrium if and only 
1 = = r






























































































x(m ) < p < m < x(p 1 (3.12)
ra I r n
The configuration (3.12) could not occur in the case studied in the text, as 
remarked in the proof of Proposition 3.1. It may of course here : assume that
the least fixed point p of x satisfies x'(p) * 1 . and think of p ,..., p
1 r
as being clustered near it.
It follows that in this case, the existence of a noncritlcal period 2 
cycle is no longer necessary for the occurrence of such stationary sunspot
equilibria (think of the case where x 1s increasing everywhere). What can be 
shown nevertheless is that stationary Markov sunspot equilibria corresponding 
to the configuration (3.9) exist if and only if there is a "noncritical" period 
2 cycle.
A trivial adaptation of the proof of Proposition 3.3 shows that there 
exist.s a stationary Markov sunspot equilibrium in every neighbourhood of a
given fixed point p > 0 of x , with x'(p) * 1 , if and only if either
x'(p) < — J or x’lp) > 1 . In the first case, all such sunspot equilibria near
p correspond to the scheme (3.9) (and Fig. 2 applies). In the second case, they
all verify (3.12). This implies in particular that if p is the least fixed
point of the map x defined in (3.10), with x'tpl * 1 , there are stationary 
sunspot equilibria involving an arbitrary number of states near it, a result 
obtained by a different route in a similar model by Woodford (153.
4. POLICY RULES
The results of the previous two sections imply that a manipulation of 




























































































all deterministic cycles with perfect foresight with a period k > 2 , and thus
all stationary Markov sunspot equilibria as well. Such a reduction of the 
"cyclical" properties of the economy obtains, however, only under the 
assumption that the traders' forecasts are correct. This assumption 
supposes a coordination across time of expectations : forecasts made at t must 
be validated by the behaviour of the next generation, i.e. their expectations, 
and so on ad infinitum. Such an intertemporal coordination of expectations, 
however, is quite unlikely to occur 1n a decentralized economy out of long run 
"stationary" equilibria. On the transition path, one should expect the agents 
to make significant forecasting errors while they attempt to learn the dynamic 
laws of the signals they receive. The corresponding efficiency losses will 
disappear only in the long run, provided that the traders' environment becomes 
eventually repetitive and simple enough to enable them to forecast correctly 
the future —  if the induced dynamic process converges to anything at all in 
calendar time.
We show in this section how deterministic policy rules can, if 
believed and understood by private units, solve this expectations coordination 
problem and guarantee perfect foresight. It was proved in C93 that monetary 
policy alone, through nominal interest payments, could achieve this goal and 
moreover, force the economy to converge to the laisser faire Golden Rule 
stationary state, provided that it was asymptotically stable in the forward 
perfect foresight dynamics that is defined in its neighbourhood. We show here 
that with lump sum transfers and public expenditures, the stability requirement 
can be dropped : there are policy rules using these channels that ensure 
perfect foresight stability of the target equilibrium.
Perfect foresight
It is convenient to assume here that the Government, instead of 
controlling the rates of growth of the money supply through lump sum transfers 



























































































the deficits D - S + G to real interest rates. As a preliminary step, we 
t t t
characterize intertemporal equilibria with perfect foresight when the sequence 
of proportional money transfers (x^) is predetermined and when evolve,
for all t , according to the policy rules
S = o  o(o x /p ) and 0 = o 6(p x /p ) . The functions (4.a)
t t t-1 t t t t t-t t t ----------
a , 6 are defined on (0,+~) and satisfy o(t) = 6(1) = 0 ,
81 * 1  + a (8 ) > 0 .
I 2 =
The last inequality appearing in (4.a) 1s the counterpart in the 
present context of the feasibility condition (1.8). It implies in particular 
that the functions
Z (0) = z (0,o(8)) and Z (0) = z (0,o(8)) + 6(8) - o(8) (4.1)I I  2 2
as well defined for all positive 8 .
An intertemporal (monetary) equilibrium with perfect foresight 
corresponding to the predetermined sequence (x^) and to the policy (4.a), is a
sequence of prices (p^) that satisfies, for all t , the equation (1.7) after
the suppression of the superscript "e", the evolution of the money supply being 
governed by
M = M x + D > 0 . M > 0  given 
t t-l t t 0 ----
Here again, such an equilibrium is most conveniently described with the 
variable 0̂  = p^ ( x^/p^ and the real balance = M^/p^. employing the






























































































(4.2)Z (0 ) + u = 0  
1 t t
One may remark that p^ Is the excess demand for the good of the old trader and
of the Government at date t . Under perfect foresight, it is given by
p = Z (8 ) (4.3)
t 2 t-l
Combining (4.2) and (4.3), we get that an Intertemporal equilibrium with 
perfect foresight is characterized by a sequence (0^) that verifies
Z (8 ) + Z (0 ) = 0 (4.4)
I t  2 t-1
such that the real balances that are implied by (4.2), or (4.3), are all
positive. Here again, the set of such equilibria with perfect foresight is, in
real terms. Independent of M and of the predetermined sequence (x ) .
o t
In view of the assumption o(1) = 6(1) = 0 , a particular equilibrium is
obtained by setting 0^ = 1 for all t : it is in fact identical to the laisser
faire Golden Rule stationary state. Then if Zj(1) t 0 , one can solve (4.4) in
0^ in a neighbourhood of the stationary state 8 = I . An important question is
whether one can choose appropriately the policy rules o , 6 so as to make 0 : 1 
asymptotically stable in this (local) forward perfect foresight dynamics. Or 
equivalently, from the implicit function theorem, whether one can choose o'(l), 
6'(1) to guarantee Z '(1) > |Zd1)| . An answer is provided by the following 
result.
PROPOSITION 4.1. Assume (4.a) and that the policy functions o , 6 are
continuously differentiable. Then if 6' (1) > 0 . one has Z'(1) + Z'(1) > 0 .
= 1 2
Given such a choice of 6' (1) . one has Z'(1) - Z'(1) > 0 and thus Z'(1)>IZ'(1)I
I 2 ---- —  1 2




























































































The proof 1s straightforward. By differentiating (4.1) and the budget 
equation (1.4), one gets
Z'(l) + Z'U) = - z (1,0) + 6' (1)
1 2 1
Z'(l) - Z'(l) = z' (1,0) - z' (1.0) + 2z' (1,0) o'(l) - 6'(1)
I 2 18 28 1 o
Since the young trader's excess demand for the good z^(1,0) at the Golden rule
is negative, 6'(1) > 0 implies Z'(1) + Z'(1) > 0 . On the other hand, goods are 
= 1 2
normal since the traders' utility function is separable, so that
0 < z' (1,0X1. Thus, given 6' (1) > 0 , one gets Z'(1) - Z'(1) > 0 if o'(1) is 
1 o - 1 2
large enough.
A simple application of the implicit function theorem yields then
COROLLARY 4.2. Let the conditions of Proposition 4.1 be satisfied, so that
Z'(1) > |Z'(1)| , and consider an interval of the form I = (1-e,1+e) . Then if 
1 2
e is small enough, for any 8 in I . there is a uniaue 8 = f(8 ) that lies
t-1 t t-1
in I and verifies (4.4), and the resulting map f is continuously differentiable
with |f'(8)| < k for some k < 1 and al1 8 in I .
Of course, if e is small enough, for any 8 in I , the sequence
o
generated by 8^ - f(8^ ) will converge to 1 , while the associated real
balances p = Z (8 ) will be positive and converge to the laisser faire
t 2 t-1
Golden rule real balance p : z (1,0) .
Stabilization Policies
The preceding results concerned the possibility of designing policy 




























































































rule stationary state asymptotically stable under the assumption of perfect 
foresight. As explained at the outset of this section, perfect foresight 
supposes an intertemporal coordination of expectations that is quite unlikely
(4)
to obtain in a decentralized economy . We show now how a combination of a 
policy rule using proportional money transfers and of policy rules like 
those contemplated in Proposition 4.1, can solve this expectations coordination 
problem and make the economy to converge to the Golden rule. The argument will 
be in fact the same as in [9, Section 6).
Assume that the economy evolves under laisser faire prior to date t = 0. 
At the outset of period 0 , the Government announces that it will implement a 
policy —  starting at t : I —  that ties the real interest rate, i.e. p^ ^ / p ^ ,
the real values of the subsidy S /p and of the deficit D /p , to the previous
t t t t
rate of inflation, according to the rule
S = D = 0  for t < 0 , and x = (p /p ) E(p /p ) 
t t = t t t-1 t-1 t-2
(4.b)
S -  p o(p x / p ) , D  
t t t-1 t t t
d 6(d x /d ) for al1 t > 1 . where E 
t t-1 t t = -----
maos (0,+-) into itself and o , 6 satisfy (4.a)
The public adoption of the rule (4.b) modifies the informational content 
of prices. If the traders understand and believe in the rule, their 
expectations will obey for all t > 0
e e
p x /p = E(p /p 1 
t t+1 t+1 t t-1
(4.5)
S /p -  a(E(P /p )) 
t+1 t+1 t t-1
The traders may be wrong about x , p , S , but they will predict
t+1 t+1 t+1
correctly 8 = p x /p and S /p . The economy will accordingly follow




























































































from t = 0 on a forward sequence of temporary equilibria obtained by plugging 
(4.5) into the temporary equilibrium equation (1.7), along which traders have 
perfect foresight about real interest rates and the real values of lump sum 
transfers. All sunspots phenomena will thus be ruled out.
By using the notation introduced in (4.1), one can formulate the 
temporary equilibrium condition for t = 0 as
Z (E(p /p )) + (M /p ) = 0 (4.6)
1 0 - 1  0 0
in which M > 0 are p are given by past history. With the same notation, 
o -1
since there are no forecasting errors along the sequence, the temporary 
equilibrium condition for t > 1 will read
Z (6(p /p )) + Z (6(p /p )) = 0 
1 t t-1 2 t-1 t-2
together with the condition that money stocks must be positive
M /p -  - Z U(p /p )) > 0 
t t 1 t t-1
The variables 8 = 6(p /p ) will therefore satisfy the perfect
t t t-1
foresight recurrence equation (4.4), with the additional restriction that they
must lie in the range of 6 . The strategy to follow now is clear. We choose
8'(1) > 0 and a'(1) large enough as in Proposition 4.1 so that Z'(l) > |Z'(1)|. 
= 1 2
As for monetary policy, we choose the same as in (9, Section 61 , that is
(4.7)
(4.8)
6 is continuously differentiable, with 6'(x) < 0 for all x , (4.c)
*
and range I = (1-e,1+e) . Moreover 6(x ) = 1 .
Monetary policy slows down the real rate growth of the money supply
attributable to nominal Interest payments, i.e. 8 = p x /p , when




























































































inflation has been high in the immediate past, and constrains the variables 8^
*
to lie in the interval I . Finally, x - 1 is the rate of inflation to be 
achieved in the long run together with the goal 8 = 1 .
If e is small enough, (4.6) has a unique solution p given M and p
o o -1
and it is stable in any Walrasian tatonnement at date 0 . By applying Corollary 
4.2 to (4.7) recursively, one gets finally
PROPOSITION 4.3. Assume that the policy rules F , a , 6 satisfy (4.b), (4.c). 
Assume that o , 6 are continuously differentiable and choose 6' (1) > 0 and
o'(1) larae enouah to ensure Z'(1) > IZ'(1)I . Then if e is small enough.
1 2
1) there is a unique sequence of temporary equilibrium prices (p^),t > 0
that satisfies (4.6), and (4.7), (4.8) for all t > 1 , given M and p . Each
= o - t
temporary equilibrium price p^ is stable in anv Walrasian tatonnement at date 
t > 0 .
2) there are no forecasting errors about real interest rates and the
real value of lump sum transfers along the seauence. Moreover 8 = E(o /o )
t t t-1
*
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t. We admit in the sequel that the Government may sell some amount of the 
good as well as purchase it. We maintain this fiction for analytical 
simplicity as a proxy for the more realistic case where public 
consumption would enter the trader's utility functions (production of a 
public good) and where the Golden Rule equilibrium would entail 
accordingly a positive consumption by the Government.
2. Specifically, under the assumptions of C9, Lemma 4.61 on the functions 
v̂  , v , eac^ member of the family has a negative Schwarzian
derivative and one can apply £10, Theorems 7 and 91. The details are 
to the reader.
3. This result is due to the fact that the specification of the traders'
beliefs through (3.1) generates an expectation function linking a
trader's forecast at date t , i.e. the probability distribution i|)(ui ,
M ) which assigns probability q to the price p(w , M ) , to his 
t ij j t+1
information (p , ui , M ) at that date. Note that the expectation 
t 1 t
function is independent of the currently observed price, a condition 
that is familiar in temporary equilibrium analysis in order to get 
existence, see Grandmont [8, 113.
4. A further problem is that, in view of the results of Section 3, many 
stationary sunspot equilibria are likely to exist near the Golden rule, 
if it is made stable as in Proposition 4.1, which would make the 
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